Аааа, как славно то!!!! А я там пыжился Упор писал
A third lesson is that a strategic focus on “strike” ashore versus “sea control” can result in doctrinal and tactical unpreparedness for interactions with “upstart” naval powers. One former U.S. naval aviator who served in the Sixth Fleet during the crisis explains that for the seven years before the Mediterranean crisis, the strategic focus of the U.S. Navy had been on supporting the bombing campaign in Vietnam.
The priorities in that war, of course, had been carrier warfare and close air support for troops in combat. Ant-isurface ship tactics and surface-to-surface missiles, which were perhaps more appropriate for a close-proximity war-at-sea scenario than was naval aviation,were insufficiently developed at the time. It is apparent, then, that the mission of projecting force “from the sea” in Vietnam had a debilitating effect on the fundamental U.S. Navy task of sea control.208
Очередное признание того, что Морской Контроль--это не на парады выходить--а тяжёлая и грязная работа, требующая соответ свующей технологии и знаний, навыков и умений.